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FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW & PUBLIC
POLICY STUDIES:
2013 NATIONAL LAWYERS CONVENTION
SHOWCASE PANEL III: FORMALISM AND
DEFERENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Panelists: Kristin Hickman, Jide O. Nzelibe, Thomas W. Merrill,1
Philip A. Hamburger2
Moderator: Hon. Jennifer Walker Elrod3

9:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.
Saturday, November 16, 2013
Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.
DEAN A. REUTER: All right. Well, let’s get started, if we could. Good
morning, and welcome. My name is Dean Reuter. I am the Director of
Practice Groups and a Vice President here at the Federalist Society. Thank
you all for being here this morning, especially at this early hour.
I mentioned yesterday morning–and I’ll repeat it very briefly
today—as Director of the Practice Groups, we do an awful lot at the
Federalist Society. Most of what we do, we accomplish through the use of
our volunteers, and we have what I would describe as a tight group of core
volunteers. I would like to loosen that group and expand it to include people
who are in the audience today. So, several of you have taken me up on my
invitation yesterday to approach me, but if you are interested, please see me
after class. We’d love to have more volunteers.
We have an unusually tight schedule today, especially this
afternoon, but I blame that on the audience. We keep getting feedback from
1

Panelists: Kristin Hickman, University of Minnesota Law School; Jide O. Nzelibe, Northwestern
University School of Law; Thomas W. Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law
School.
2
Philip A. Hamburger participated in Showcase Panel III, however his remarks do not appear in
this transcript.
3
Moderator: Hon. Jennifer Walker Elrod, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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folks like you that we want more and more programming, so we’ve tried to
accommodate you by squeezing more and more into the schedule, so that
accounts for the tight schedule this afternoon.
I hope everybody has had a good time at the convention. This is the
best day of the convention today, so thank you for being here. We heard
from Judge Gorsuch last night. I thought he was extraordinary, and of
course, Governor Walker was really something. And as he talked about
public sector jobs and governance and so forth, I was reminded of a very
quick joke that I will tell, and it concerns a public sector employee, who is
talking to his private sector friend. And he is bemoaning the fact that his
pension is changing, and his retirement benefits are changing. His health
care is changing. It’s just all terrible the way he is being treated in his job,
and his private sector friend looks at him and says, “Well, what’s a job?”
[Laughter.]
DEAN A. REUTER: So it could be worse, and it is worse for
some people.
But let’s get right to the program today. Our third Showcase Panel,
this one is discussing deference in the administrative law, and I am very
pleased to welcome back a repeat offender to our moderator slot, our Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge, Jennifer Elrod. Thank you for doing this.
[Applause.]
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Thank you, Dean. I think you
have been calling all of the Fifth Circuit Judges who are here “repeat
offenders.” I hope we’re not in big trouble, and he does say that every day
is the best day. I heard him say that yesterday, but I’m so glad that today is
truly the best day.
It is a privilege to be with you here this morning. As someone who
has been a member of the Federalist Society since law school, it is always
gratifying to come to D.C. and see so many students, the next generation of
lawyers, eager to learn from the leading scholars in the field about the
Constitution, the separation of powers, and limited government.
Speaking of leading scholars, we have a very distinguished panel
here today. First is Professor Kristin Hickman. Professor Kristin Hickman
is the Harlan Albert Rogers Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota
Law School. She also taught at Harvard Law School and Northwestern
University School of Law. In fact, I believe all of our panelists here today
have a Northwestern connection. Professor Hickman teaches and writes
primarily in the areas of tax law, administrative law, and statutory
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interpretation, and her articles have appeared in numerous journals.4 Her
work on Chevron’s Domain with Professor Merrill was cited by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Mead, and several of Professor
Hickman’s articles have been cited in judicial opinions and other briefs.5
She also co-authors the Administrative Law Treatise and a case book on
federal administrative law.6 She received her B.S. degree in business
administration, with a concentration in accounting and a secondary major in
history, from Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas, and after practicing
several years as a CPA, Professor Hickman then earned her J.D. degree
magna cum laude from Northwestern, where she was awarded the Raoul
Berger Prize for her work on Chevron’s Domain. Following law school,
Professor Hickman clerked for the Honorable David B. Sentelle of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. We’re
glad to have Professor Hickman with us here today.
Our next panelist, Professor Jide Nzelibe, is a professor of law and
an associate dean for faculty and Research at Northwestern University Law
School. He has been teaching at Northwestern since 2004, and his research
interests are in international trade, foreign relations, international law, the
administrative state, international humanitarian law, and the separation of
powers. He has been a visiting professor at the law schools of the
University of Chicago, Tel Aviv University, Harvard University, and New
York University. He received his law degree from Yale Law School and
clerked for the Honorable Stephen F. Williams on the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. He worked at a law firm here
in Washington, D.C. for a few years before joining the legal academy.
Welcome, Professor Nzelibe.
Professor Tom Merrill is the Charles Evans Hughes Professor of
Law at Columbia Law School, where he writes widely in the fields of
property and administrative law. He has written a number of works about
the history of administrative law and about judicial review of agency
interpretations of law.7 Professor Merrill is a graduate of Grinnell College
and Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. He is also a
graduate of the University of Chicago Law School. He clerked for the D.C.
Circuit and then for Justice Harry A. Blackmun of the U.S. Supreme Court.
4
See generally Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining the Treasury’s (Lack
of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1727 (2007); Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006).
5
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001); Brief for Respondents at 50, United
States of America v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al., 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139). See
generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).
6
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (5th ed. Supp.
2014); KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2010).
7
See, e.g., Chevron’s Domain, supra note 3; see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
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From 1987 to 1990, he was Deputy Solicitor General in the U.S. Department
of Justice. Professor Merrill has previously taught at Northwestern Law
School and at Yale Law School, and he is a member of the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences.
We welcome our very distinguished panelists.
[Applause.]
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: You should be familiar with
our format by now. The format for today is as follows. Each panelist will
speak for a few minutes, and then the panelists will have an opportunity to
respond to each other’s remarks, and then we will conclude with questions
from the audience. The topic for discussion—
Do you think we’re going to conclude?
[Laughter.]
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: See, we’re already having a
lively interchange between the panelists.
The topic for discussion is formalism and deference in
administrative law. As we know, the landmark case of Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council has changed the face of modern administrative
law.8 The panel will address the rightness and limitations of Chevron
deference, especially in the context of agency decisions on the scope of the
agencies’ jurisdictional mandates. Should the federal courts defer, or should
they not defer in this context? We need guidance. Justices Scalia and
Thomas recently differed from Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy
and Alito on these issues.9 Who is right, and why? Does the answer depend
in any measure on the growth of the administrative state, and are there larger
issues of jurisprudential philosophy at stake? It may just come down to
what you are really afraid of in this fundamental disagreement that the
Justices are having. Chief Justice Roberts describes it as a “fundamental
disagreement.”10 Are you afraid, as Justice Scalia discusses, of a lack of
stability and chaos, of unaccountable federal judges running muckety-muck,
deciding numerous issues in sundry ways,11 or as the Chief Justice recounts,
are you afraid, in the words of Madison, of the “accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands” in a vast and evergrowing administrative state?12

8
See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding that courts must utilize a two-part test to determine whether a governmental agency’s
interpretation of a statute is given deference over the interpretation by Congress).
9
See generally City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
10
Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
11
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868–75.
12
Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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We look forward to a lively discussion on this topic. Thank you.
Professor Hickman?
[Applause.]
KRISTIN HICKMAN:13 Good morning. Is this working? Okay, good.
I’m going to talk mostly about the Mead case, actually.14 The panel
is about Chevron, but rather than talking about Chevron, I’m going to talk
about Mead because, to me, that is where the action is. Judges may apply
Chevron differently, particularly at Chevron step one where some judges
would find ambiguity in a stop sign and other judges will pull every tool out
of the statutory interpretation toolbox, but not a single one of the Justices of
the Supreme Court is willing to come out and say, “Hey, let’s rethink this
whole Chevron thing.”
I think there are good reasons for that. There are just some
questions that can’t be effectively answered using traditional tools of
statutory construction, and in those instances, agencies are simply in a better
position to fill the gaps. They’re better equipped than the courts because of
their expertise.
But once you accept that Chevron is here to stay, then it seems to
me that the focus really has to shift over to Mead. Now, since I am first on
this panel, I am going to start with just a little bit of background to make
sure that everyone here knows what we’re talking about. Then I am going
to offer a vision or really three competing visions of Mead and Chevron that
I draw from the text and jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. And finally,
to the extent that I have time, then I am going to talk about why these
competing visions explain the outcome in the recent City of Arlington case
and also make future close cases hard to predict, including one facing the
Supreme Court this term, the Quality Stores case, in which the Court may
have to decide the standard of review for IRS revenue rulings.15
For several years now, the Court has recognized two competing
standards of review for evaluating the substantive validity of agency
interpretations of statutes. One is the two-step test of Chevron.16 First, the
court assesses the clarity of the relevant statute, and if the statute’s meaning
is clear, then that’s the end of the inquiry, because both agencies and courts
must defer to and respect the clearly expressed intent of Congress.17 But if
13
See Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 527 (2014) (discussing
these remarks in a more developed manner).
14
See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
15
See generally United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1395 (2014); see also Brief of
Professor Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Quality Stores, 131 S. Ct.
704 (No. 12-1408), 2013 WL 6114794 (calling the Court’s attention to the Mead issue raised by the
case).
16
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
17
Id.
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the statute is ambiguous, then the Chevron’s second step calls upon a
reviewing court to defer to any permissible interpretation of the statute.18
Skidmore is the second available standard that the Court uses to
evaluate agency interpretations of statutes.19 Skidmore and related cases call
upon reviewing courts to consider various factors in determining the degree
of deference that is appropriate for a given agency legal interpretation,
including but not limited to the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, and its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements.20
In Mead, the Court adopted another two-part test for deciding
whether Chevron or Skidmore provides the appropriate evaluative standard
for a particular agency interpretation of a statute.21 The Mead test asks
whether Congress has given the agency in question the authority to bind
regulated parties with the force of law, and whether the agency action in
question is an exercise of that congressionally delegated power to act with
the force of law.22 Where the answers to both of Mead’s questions are
affirmative, then Chevron provides the standard of review.23 If the answer
to either of Mead’s questions is negative, then Skidmore offers the
appropriate evaluative standard.24
Now, as with Chevron, the rhetoric the justices use in talking about
Mead is not always consistent. In large part, I think that is because, as I read
the jurisprudence, notwithstanding that Mead was an 8-to-1 decision, with
only Justice Scalia dissenting, we really see three rather than two distinct
visions of the relationship among Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore in the
Court’s jurisprudence. Those three versions are best exemplified, I think, by
the three opinions by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia, and Justice Breyer in a
case called Christensen v. Harris County, which predates Mead by about a
year and foreshadows Mead.25 And you see the themes of those opinions––
the Justices’ opinions in Christensen––throughout the Court’s post-Mead
jurisprudence. So to me, Christensen is really the Rosetta Stone for figuring
out that post-Mead jurisprudence.
Justice Thomas’ opinions, particularly in Christensen, but later in
Brand X as well, reflect what I call the “decision tree model.”26 Mead has

18

Id. at 843.
See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
20
Id. at 140.
21
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 234–35.
25
See generally Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
26
Id. at 588; Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980,1000–
03 (2005).
19
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two steps: yes or no questions.27 They in turn lead to either Chevron or
Skidmore, which are two distinct standards of review. And if you go to
Chevron, then you have its two steps, and you take them in turn;28 whereas,
if you go to Skidmore, then you take Skidmore’s contextual factors, which
can also be applied somewhat formalistically by looking at the individual
factors.29 And while you don’t precisely add them up––as in, we’ve got
three factors on one side and two on the other––nevertheless, you look to
see whether they are present or absent. We can quibble over whether Mead
is a step zero or a step one-and-a-half, as some scholars have talked about;30
but either way, each step on the decision tree asks its own discrete question,
and you have to hit each step of the inquiry one at a time. And this model,
as it sounds, is a fairly formalistic approach to Mead, Chevron, and
Skidmore and the question of deference.
Justice Breyer’s opinions, particularly in Christensen and then later
on in Barnhart v. Walton and a few other cases, reflect what I call the
“impressionist painting model” of Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore.31 Justice
Breyer views all three of those cases as one big happy standard with a whole
bunch of factors that we look at together. Like Justice Thomas, he’s happy
to emphasize delegation as very, very important.32 That’s what Mead talks
about and a lot of its progeny talk about, but in the end, Justice Breyer just
sort of throws delegation, traditional tools of statutory construction, and
Skidmore’s contextual factors all at the canvas together to see what picture
emerges.33 The delegation factor that is so central to Mead operates as kind
of a super-factor, really like kind of a bright color that pops out of the
canvas a little more than some of the other hues. But at the end of the day, I
don’t really think that Justice Breyer considers delegation absolutely
essential for Chevron deference. It’s just another factor.
Justice Scalia, more or less, stands alone when it comes to Mead,
Chevron, and Skidmore.34 He hates Mead. He thinks Skidmore is
completely anachronistic, and deference for him is a matter of Chevron or
no deference at all.35 He really focuses on those tools of statutory
construction. Any authoritative agency interpretation that gets past those
27

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
29
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
30
Patrick J. Smith, Chevron Step Zero After City of Arlington, 140 TAX NOTES 713, 714 n.12
(2013) (discussing the argument within the legal community over naming this portion of the test step
zero or step one and a half).
31
See generally Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S.
576, 592 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32
See, e.g., Christensen, 529 U.S. at 596–97.
33
See Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 225.
34
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239–61 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589–91 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Skidmore deference to authoritative agency
views is an anachronism[.]”).
28
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and reflects agency expertise is eligible for Chevron deference.36 In his own
way, Justice Scalia’s approach is just as impressionistic, I think, as Justice
Breyer’s. He just uses fewer factors, emphasizing expertise and leaving out
delegation from among Skidmore’s contextual factors.
It seems to me, then, taking those different views, if you go look at
what the circuit courts are doing, they overwhelmingly seem to apply the
decision tree model of Mead, Chevron, and Skidmore. And I think this is a
really great model, because in most cases, it yields very clear answers about
whether Chevron or Skidmore provides the right standard of review, largely
based on the format that the agency uses to articulate its interpretation of the
law. So notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication get
Chevron. Informal guidance and most informal adjudications get Skidmore.
There are a few close cases, but most of the cases can fall into one of those
two groups.
At the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia notwithstanding, Justice
Thomas’s decision tree and Justice Breyer’s impressionist painting use the
same language, usually yield the same results in terms of whether Chevron
or Skidmore provides the right evaluative standard, but when you get to
some of the closer cases like City of Arlington, that agreement starts to fall
apart.
So City of Arlington asks whether Chevron deference is appropriate
when the interpretive question at issue goes to the heart of an agency’s
jurisdiction.37 Using the decision tree model, the argument really came
down to whether Mead’s first step asks courts to consider delegation statuteby-statute or provision-by-provision, and the Court in the past has seemed to
treat Mead as a statute-by-statute kind of an inquiry.38 For Chevron not to
apply in the context of jurisdictional questions, Mead’s first step would have
to go to a provision-by-provision inquiry, looking at individual provisions of
the statute in delegation terms. The problem with taking Mead to the
individual provision level is it leaves you with very little or nothing left to
do as you go down the decision tree and get to Chevron step one. In other
words, the sheer awkwardness of fitting that jurisdictional question
exception from Chevron into the decision tree model dooms that argument.
With a more impressionist approach to Mead and Chevron,
remember we’re looking at delegation, traditional tools of statutory
construction, and contextual factors altogether, or in Justice Scalia’s view,
fewer factors than that, but we’re still looking at everything kind of together
36

Id. at 590.
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1867–68 (2013) (quoting Brief for Petitioners, City of
Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (No. 11-1545)).
38
E.g., National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005);
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original
Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 473–74 (2002).
37
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at a Chevron step one level.39 Once you approach things with that
impressionist model, there’s really no room to pull out an independent
jurisdictional check. It just gets thrown into the mush, and anything that
takes you outside that impressionistic bubble is going to get rejected.
I think at this point in time at the Supreme Court, we have more
impressionists than we have decision tree people, and that’s really how it
ends up breaking down and why City of Arlington came out the way that it
did.
I’m about out of time.
Quality Stores, which is coming up this term, yields a similar, but
slightly different problem.40 IRS revenue rulings are informal guidance
documents in the sense that they don’t go through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, but they are legally formal in the sense that you can be
penalized for failing to comply with them.41 So when you start with the
decision tree model, you are looking at Mead and saying, “Well, Congress
has clearly delegated the power to the agency to act with the force of law.”
They decided as much in a case called Mayo a couple years ago, talking
about the Treasury and the IRS.42 And clearly, because of the penalties, it
seems like revenue rulings carry the force of law, no matter how you want to
slice and dice that term, which takes you to Chevron. But these rulings
don’t have notice and comment, which is really troubling if you are going to
apply Chevron.
I filed an amicus brief yesterday in which I say, well, maybe we can
get to Chevron step two and just declare the rulings all unreasonable. But
the decision tree model doesn’t work very well with revenue rulings.43 With
the impressionistic model, on the other hand, we’re just throwing everything
in together, and I don’t know whether we’ll come out Chevron or Skidmore
on that one. Probably Skidmore. We’ll have to wait and see. But I’m really
curious to see how it comes out. I don’t know what’s going to happen, but
keep an eye out for that one, and we’ll see if my impressionist painting
versus decision tree model ends up holding steady with that case as well.
Thank you very much.
39
See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 225 (2002) (discussing the use of delegation, statutory
construction, and contextual factors); Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589–91 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40
See generally United States v. Quality Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 1395 (2014).
41
Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-Brief-Primer; see also Kristin E. Hickman,
Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 526-29 (2013) (discussing the legal force of
revenue rulings).
42
See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713–14 (2011)
(stating that “[t]his case falls squarely within the bounds of, and is properly analyzed under, Chevron and
Mead.”).
43
Brief of Professor Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at *4, Quality
Stores, 131 S. Ct. 704 (No. 12-1408), 2013 WL 6114794.
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[Applause.]
JIDE O. NZELIBE: Good morning. I have a little confession to make.
I’m sort of a stranger in the mix here. I am not really, in many ways, an
administrative law person. I encounter administrative law on occasion when
I teach international trade and we get to antidumping stuff in the course, and
it has to do with calculating antidumping margins and how Department of
Commerce and Court of International Trade deal with it. And usually, what
I do in that context is that I bribe the class with Girl Scout cookies to make it
through, until we get to the fun WTO stuff that they are waiting for.
[Laughter.]
JIDE O. NZELIBE: In any event, there is something about this that I think
may be helpful, which is when I come in and read City of Arlington and I
say to myself: “Who am I rooting for here?” What I am going to present
here is sort of a realist perspective of City of Arlington. Who are you
rooting for if you like limited government? Should you—or if you desire
limited government, should you be rooting for Scalia, or should you be
rooting for Roberts?
Now, look at what Scalia is concerned about in City of Arlington,
the typical motive of Scalia, right?44 Clarity.45 There has to be a clear line
here. If you upset the cart of Chevron you are opening up multiple ways in
which courts can go in different directions, right? Much of this will result in
more confusion and less clarity. So Scalia is saying let us have one
deference rule here. Let’s call it Chevron, and let’s work with it, right? All
this new stuff that you’re putting in, there has to be a different standard
when you come to jurisdiction and something else. It is just going to blur
the lines. Lawyers are very, very clever. They will throw in and claim
something as jurisdiction when it isn’t, and we won’t be able to sort it out.
Now, let us look at Justice Roberts.46 I don’t know if people have seen
the dissent. The beginning of the dissent reads like an anti-Leviathan’s screed:
the administrative state is growing, it’s getting out of control, the
administrative bureaucracy has its hand in everything.47 And here is one
suggestion: if you want to fight the Leviathan, I don’t think having courts not
deferring on whether something is an interpretive authority or jurisdiction will
get you much traction. Many of the cases where this has come up have not to
do with efforts to limit an agency in a pure sense, and the devices in which the
agency expands probably have very little to do with whether or not you are
using Chevron deference or some other form of deference.
44
45

City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013).
Id. (noting that “[w]here Congress has established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond

it[.]”).
46
47

Id. at 1877–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at 1878–79.
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To get some bit of historical perspective on this issue, think about
Scalia’s longevity of the court. He is one of these people who has seen it
all, and he was one of the people who was actually serving on a court when
Chevron was decided. He was on the D.C. Circuit, and by the way, he
wrote an article about it.48 He wrote an article about it. So did, by the way,
his fellow then-D.C. Circuit judge, a gentleman by the name of Kenneth
Starr.49 They both wrote articles praising Chevron. They were very happy
that Chevron arrived on the scene, because they knew what the world was
like pre-Chevron, and it wasn’t a very pretty world.
And one of the reasons why Chevron was admirable to them is one
of the reasons that I don’t think we appreciate it much in the modern
environment. But the executive branch back then was in a deregulatory
phase. And there was a fear that courts would get in the way of agencies
that were trying to scale back the scope of their regulatory activities. This
was at a time when there was an effort for agencies to cut back because
there are constituencies that wanted deregulation, and because Reagan won
on an electoral platform that says, “I will break the growth of government.”
And one of the things he did was try to get some of these agencies to scale
back, but federal judges were looking at this development saying that there
was something wrong here. There was a statute passed some time ago. At
the time, the agency said that it meant one thing (probably more regulation),
and now a couple of years later, you are saying that you interpret it to mean
that you can deregulate. You are pulling away from your pro-regulation
mandate. Something is wrong. We ought not to let you do that. But when
Chevron was decided, it was considered a very nice device, because
agencies could change course, even if it’s under political pressure, and they
could decide to deregulate. And courts won’t be able to come up and say, “I
insist in the name of the law that you regulate.”
[Laughter.]
JIDE O. NZELIBE: The agency can say, “Well, you know, I’m under
pressure. There’s sixteen different interest groups and powerful politicians
that are on my head who don’t want me to regulate. I may have to back
off.” And maybe the agency will give a sort of very, very nice-sounding
reason why it wasn’t doing it, and maybe somebody like Breyer will say, “I
can smell through that. I know it, because the Republicans came into town
that you’re trying to pull back,” and what Scalia is going to say to him is,
“So be it. That’s how the political system works.” You like something. A
new administration comes in. They don’t like it so much. They can pull
back. And by the way, that is how often you fight the Leviathan. You don’t
48
See generally Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511 (1989).
49
See generally Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283
(1986).
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fight the Leviathan by asking courts who, according to my own definition
and according to what last I saw—excuse me, Judge Elrod—are actually
part of the state. You don’t say to the state, “Hey, you’re growing. You’re
getting more power. Please stop yourself.”
[Laughter.]
JIDE O. NZELIBE: “Go in and ask another anchor of your state to
collaborate and stop yourself.” No. What happens is that usually some
interest group, some faction, some constituency says, “I don’t like the state
growing into my affairs. I want it to back off.” Then they campaign. Then
they win. Then they tell the agency, “Back off,” and that is how you can
sometimes trim down on the Leviathan.
The idea that courts will serve this role, I think is a little bit
problematic, because whenever you have a vision of what you want a court
to do and you believe it will lead to certain consequences and it’s predicated
on a certain notion—and I say, “What is that notion?” You say, “Well, I
would like the court to do this,” and I would say, “Depending on what?
What is it contingent on?” “Contingent upon them having these people
serve on the court, people like Judge Elrod.” And I might ask, “What if you
don’t have those people? What if you don’t get the libertarian on the bench?
What if it’s a different set of judges?” If you like the courts, the way I
would say it as an institutional actor, imagine the judge that you dislike the
most and say, “Imagine nine of them are serving on the Supreme Court.
Would I feel comfortable having them impose their jurisdiction over this
kind of activity?” And if you say, “Yes,” then I would say go ahead. But if
it is contingent on who is appointed to the Court, then I would say it’s
probably not a good idea, because that is a very peripheral and myopic view.
One day, the course will shift on the Court, and when it shifts, you will be
left alone.
By the way, beyond that, there is another problem with all of this,
which is even if you strip away what courts do—and I do think there’s
something about what courts do, a certain kind of integrity. Most of us may
feel that if we want something like consistency or impartiality, going
through a judge and saying, “Look, here is this license. It has been awarded
to some company, because there was a Republican legislator in their
district,” most people agree that whether or not the judge is left-leaning or
right-leaning, they may strike that down. That kind of arbitrariness that is
sheer politics, courts don’t like.
But the problem is that the kind of decisional consistency by
agencies that you value in courts can come back and haunt you if you’re
interested in having what I would call “policy variation” in what agencies
do, because what happens—and this you see this in Breyer—is that again
and again, the court will say, “Why did you, the agency, tell me this
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seventeen years ago, and now you are telling me something different?
Why? I want you to be consistent.” But if you want to trim back the
Leviathan, sometimes I think it behooves you that the agency is not
consistent, that it could say, “I don’t want to follow this path anymore.”
And that, I think, is something that Scalia might have seen. That, I think is a
lesson. He remembers an era when Chevron wasn’t in the picture, and he
saw what courts were doing. And he saw how they could act, and he knew
that courts could sometimes go to an agency and say, “I want you to do
more,” and somebody could bring a claim and say that an agency was not
regulating enough. The court could say to the agency, “I want you to do
more.” He’s seen all of that. He’s been around the block, and therefore, I
would say if you’re rooting for limiting the Leviathan, I do think that Scalia
has a better take on this than Roberts. And I’ll leave it at that.
[Applause.]
THOMAS W. MERRILL: Well, two very thoughtful takes on Arlington.
First, a disclaimer or a confession of sorts. I did an amicus brief on
Arlington on behalf of the state and local governments.50 It reads a lot like
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, although not as eloquently put as his dissent,
so at least you know where I’m coming from here.51
I think it’s appropriate to step back a little bit from the intricacies of
the jurisprudence of the Chevron doctrine, although I’ll get back to that
eventually, and ask why we have judicial review of agency action in the first
place. Maybe we shouldn’t. Maybe the Supreme Court and the federal
courts should just confine themselves to issues of individual constitutional
rights and statutory interpretation and diversity cases and so forth, but why
do we have a judicial review of agency action? Well, one argument
classically is that it helps ensure fairness to individuals—that individuals get
caught up in the administrative state. Frequently, agencies misunderstand
their circumstances, and courts could act as a corrective in terms of making
sure that individuals are not treated on the basis of improper understandings
of the facts that pertain to their particular case.
And I think this is still an important function of judicial review. If
you look at what happens in the federal district courts, for example, I think
you would see this going forward. At the jurisprudential level, however,
both Congress and the Supreme Court have largely ceded authority to
agencies to engage in fact-finding in individual cases. Courts provide very
deferential review of agency fact-finding, and so judicial review acts as a
backstop, but it applies rather weakly. And deference, the thing of our
50
See generally Amici Curiae Brief of the Nat’l Governors Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners,
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2012) (Nos. 11-1545, 11-1547), 2012 WL 5982593.
51
Compare City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1877–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) with Amici Curiae
Brief of the Nat’l Governors Ass’n, supra note 48.
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panel, has sort of taken over in terms of protecting individuals against unfair
treatment.
Another rationale might be to monitor the policymaking of
agencies, to make sure that agencies are acting in a reasonable or rational
fashion when they articulate policy. The Hard Look Doctrine that became
very fashionable in the 1970s seems to point toward this being a rationale
for judicial review, and again, we still have that on the books.52 There are
still occasions when courts will question the reasoned decision-making or
lack thereof of agencies and will send cases back for further elaboration, but
the trend here also seems toward increasing deference.
A few terms ago in a case called FCC v. Fox Broadcasting, the
court seemed to cut back sharply on the degree of reasoning that is needed
in order to justify an agency change in policy.53 So again, deference seems
to be washing over that particular function of judicial review of agency
policymaking.
The last great rationale is what my colleague, Henry Monaghan,
calls “boundary maintenance,” and here, the purpose of judicial review is to
make sure that the allocation of powers in our society between government
agencies, different branches of government, different levels of government,
and between government and individuals is maintained.54 It is partly a
function of protecting the individual against Leviathan, but it goes much
beyond that. It is also making sure that the checks and balances that operate
within our government are maintained and that one branch of government
does not usurp the authority properly given to another branch of
government.
If I ask myself the question of how we are going to maintain the
boundaries between different agencies, between agencies and courts,
between the federal government and the states, between the government and
individuals, which branch of government has the best case for having a
competency to do that, I don’t think any branch has a clear outstanding
competence to do this. But I think that the judiciary, particularly the federal
judiciary, has the best claim to be able to engage in this boundary
maintenance function, because they have more understanding of
constitutional as well as statutory law. They have some sense of history.
They have some sense of our evolved traditions. They have some sense of
the competencies, the strengths and weaknesses of different levels and
branches of government. They’re experienced, and they have shown to be
52
See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507, 525–35
(1985).
53
FCC v. Fox Telev. Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012).
54
See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33–
34 (1983).
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impartial and to exercise judgment.
Agencies, I don’t think are nearly as well suited to engage in
boundary maintenance. Agencies usually have fairly narrow missions. The
people who work at agencies usually identify very strongly with those
missions. They are not overly fond of sharing their power with other
agencies or entities of government, and they tend to be rather narrowgauged and not terribly conversant with broader constitutional traditions or
historical understandings. So I think if we were designing a system from
scratch, boundary maintenance would be given to the courts and would not
be given to the agencies.
Arlington says the opposite. Arlington was a boundary maintenance
case. It involved conflicts between both the courts and of the FCC as to
who was going to decide how rapidly wireless towers were going to be built
up, what was a reasonable period of time for deciding local land use
decisions, and a conflict between the states and the federal government
because decisions about local land use are classically handled by state land
use planning boards and are reviewed by state courts, not by federal courts.55
So it was a boundary maintenance case, and the Court, five to four,
said that unless Congress speaks with clarity in a statute prescribing a
boundary, the agency can decide through statutory interpretation what the
boundary means, and the courts under Chevron will defer to the agency’s
decision.56
How did this possibly happen? How did the Court seemingly cast
its last unique rationale for engaging in judicial review of agency action into
the deference pile along with fairness to individuals and agency
policymaking? I think the explanation is provided if you listen to or read
the transcript of the oral argument. Solicitor General Verrilli, who has had
some rough days at oral argument, had a very good day in the Arlington
case. His basic pitch was, “All you need is Mead.”57
[Laughter.]
THOMAS W. MERRILL: And this picks up on some of Kristin’s very
able comments.
His argument was, “Look, you’ve got this Mead case which has got
this two-part test for when Chevron should apply or something else like
Skidmore should apply, and that’s kind of complicated. Courts have been
sort of struggling with figuring this out, and don’t complicate it anymore.
Don’t worry yourselves or instruct the lower courts to worry themselves
55

City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874–75.
Id. at 1874.
See Oral Argument at 30:8–13, 16–21, City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (No. 11-1545), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-1545.pdf.
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about whether the agency has authority over this area or not. That’s asking
too much. Let’s just keep it as simple as we’ve already got it, and all you
need is Mead.”58 And I think that explains the extremely odd makeup of the
Arlington decision. You had Justice Scalia, who is a fanatic on this
question. He’s not an impressionist; he’s a fanatic. He thinks that Chevron
should apply to everything, and that’s the end of the matter. It’s not
pointillism; it’s bright line drawing. And he got Justice Thomas,
unfortunately—who previously, as Kristin has described has been a rather
able exponent of Chevron—and what some wag called the “three chicks” to
join him in this decision.
[Laughter.]
THOMAS W. MERRILL: And I think the motivation was that Verrilli
caught the mood of the day, which is we don’t need more complexity, and
so in the interest of avoiding more complexity in Chevron-land, we have
essentially, apparently tossed out judicial boundary maintenance over the
structure of the federal government.
Now, what’s the solution, or what can we do here going forward? I
think there is perhaps a way out of this problem going forward, and it has to
do again with good old Mead, as Kristin has described it to you. Justice
Scalia previously has had virtually an aneurysm whenever the Mead case
was mentioned. He would fulminate endlessly about the case and about the
good old all- things-considered approach and so forth, and he hates Mead
because it “complexifies” what he thought was relatively simple.59
The untold story of Arlington—or the dirty little secret of
Arlington—is that in order to get four other Justices to join him, Justice
Scalia had to swallow a very bitter Mead pill. So when you read toward the
end of the opinion by Justice Scalia, you will find the following interesting
passages. The first, it says, “The dissent is correct that United States v.
Mead Corp. requires that, for Chevron deference to apply, the agency must
have received congressional authority to determine the particular matter at
issue and the particular manner adopted. No one disputes that.”60 And then
later, he says, “It suffices to decide this case that the preconditions to
deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously
vested the FCC with general authority to administer the Communications
Act through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation at
issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”61 That is a direct
paraphrase of Mead, or at least the parts of Mead that are clear, the parts that
Kristin and I in our law review article advocated.
58
59
60
61

Id. at 32:25; 33: 1–5, 23–25; 34:1–9.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 245 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874.
Id.
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So Justice Scalia has apparently embraced Mead. Now, why is that
significant? I think it’s significant because, as Kristin briefly mentioned, the
issue going forward then boils down to how broad or how narrow the
delegation of authority to act with the force of law has to be. Justice Scalia
seems to write in Arlington that all you need is some general grant of
rulemaking out there, the organic statute that establishes the agency, plus
something that kind of looks like a rule or has some kind of force-of-law
aspect to it, and bingo, Chevron will apply.62
Justice Roberts argues that in fact, a better reading of Chevron and
of the cases that follow Chevron is that the court has always asked whether
the particular issue before the Court was one as to which Congress has
delegated authority to act with the force of law.63
Justice Scalia in future cases will no doubt argue that Arlington
settles this in favor of the “one rulemaking grant is enough” approach. But I
think, I hope at least, that Justice Roberts’s conception will ultimately
prevail here. I’m not sure that the Justices that joined Justice Scalia in the
interest of “All you need is Mead” will necessarily agree that what Mead
means is that one grant of rulemaking is enough. And if in the future, the
court decides that we are going to look provision-by-provision to see
whether the Congress has granted authority to act with the force of law,
what do you get? Well, you simply get judicial monitoring of the
boundaries of the agency’s action, because through the Mead inquiry, the
court can now say either that the agency is or is not acting within the scope
of its delegated authority, which is really the issue in Arlington whether or
not courts will engage in that inquiry and will exercise independent
judgment in engaging that inquiry.
Everyone agrees that the Mead inquiry is done without deference to
the agency, and so if you just take Roberts’s little variation on Mead, that
we’re going to do it provision-by-provision rather than statute-by-statute, I
think the courts are back in the business of monitoring boundaries, which I
think is the last remaining robust argument in favor of the judicial review of
agency action.
Thank you.
[Applause.]
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Well, is it time to move along
and just accept this, or should the courts push back? Professor, do you have
any other comments that you want to make?
KRISTIN HICKMAN: Well, I will say, as much as I am sympathetic to
62
63
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the idea that we should continue to protest the idea of deference to agencies
on some level, I do think the horse is out of the barn, at which point it
becomes a matter of curtailing by increment rather than curtailing
wholesale. I suppose there’s an extent to which the rest of us are talking
about the extent to which we curtail by increment.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Professor Nzelibe?
JIDE O. NZELIBE: Just one follow-up point. Again, going back, if you
take a consequentialist view about what you think courts will want to do—
and whenever I hear the word “rule of law” and courts being involved, I
think there is always sometimes a presumption behind that, depending on
whatever your philosophical and your ideological point of view is, that there
is some affinity between what you think the rule of law is and some
substantive policy, like the Leviathan will be checked or something like that.
And the reality is in American history, if you are a very good student, there
is very, very little record that the courts have ever played a role in checking
the Leviathan. They are in most cases the prime facilitator of the Leviathan.
If you took them away from the picture, you’d probably have a much
different state and different variety. You’d probably have much more open
conflict, much more lack of resolution between the federal and state
governments about what the boundaries of authorities are, much more like a
resolution between boundaries between agencies.
When the courts come in, what they usually do is they say this is
where the boundary is drawn, and a lot of time, they favor decentralization
of power.64 They’ve said to the President, “You win.” They said to the
federal government, “The states lose.” They said to the other agency, “You
can expand,” and that’s the rule of law.
So you have to be very careful as to what you think that means,
because it may not mean substantively what you think it means. It’s just a
court speaking. It’s a resolution. It doesn’t necessarily mean that they’re
going to check it. So I just want to leave it at that.
THOMAS W. MERRILL: So one interesting thing about Arlington was
that there was a discussion in the opinions of whether or not Chevron
deference is consistent with the idea that judges have this duty to uphold the
law.65 The Administrative Procedure Act in fact instructs judges to decide
independently all questions of law, and the answer given by Chief Justice
Roberts at least was that Chevron-style deference is consistent with that,
because it rests on the understanding that Congress has directed the agency
to decide—when Congress creates an ambiguity and gives an agency
64
See, e.g., Maria Dinzeo, Los Angeles Courts Favor Decentralization, COURTHOUSE NEWS
SERVICE (Apr. 20, 2011, 7:24 AM), http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/04/20/35969.htm.
65
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1880 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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authority to administer a particular statute, that that is Congress’ decision to
have the agency decide the meaning of the statute and resolve the ambiguity,
and so that’s consistent with the rule of law.66 You’re sort of tracing
Congress’ directions through a delegation to the agency.
What’s not consistent with the duty to enforce the law is for courts
to defer to the agency’s understanding that it has been given authority to
decide this question. That is to allow the whole structure of government to
be bootstrapped into deference to agencies and really throws the rule of law
out the window. So there is a distinction between agencies’ resolutions of
ambiguities where Congress has clearly delegated authority to them and
where Congress has not.
With respect to good old King James, the prerogative was when the
king acted based on his own inherent authority. The stuff we talk about
today is where Congress has by majoritarian democratic processes decided
to delegate authority to the executive branch, and the executive branch then
exercises that delegated authority. So there is in my mind at least a
distinction between claims of inherent power by the executive, which I think
are deeply troubling and threatening to our liberties and delegated authority
within the scope of that delegated authority. Of course, to make sure that
the latter doesn’t sort of bleed over into the former, courts have to decide
whether or not agencies are acting within the scope of their authority.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: We have a number of people
who have lined up to ask the distinguished panel some questions. We’ll
start with a question from this side of the room.
ATTENDEE: I’d like to direct my question to Professor Merrill, though.
Do you think that the Chevron doctrine has really been used as a
political tool in the last 20 years, and the experience has become that this is
more a tool of politics than it is a rule of law? And I would point you
specifically to the area of climate change in Massachusetts v. EPA.67 During
a Republican administration, we had a determination that CO2 was not a
pollutant under the Clean Air Act and therefore could not be regulated
without additional legislation. This area was hotly debated in Congress, and
then the Supreme Court reached in over Congress and plucked the entire
area of global climate change and gave it to the EPA—it was during a
Democratic administration—determining that in fact CO2 was a pollutant.68
Do you think that this refusal to give deference to Republican attempts to
restrain the growth of government and giving deference to Democratic
administrations who want to grow government really means that Chevron is
66
67
68
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nothing more than a means for judges to express their personal opinions
through judicial decision-making?
THOMAS W. MERRILL: Well, that’s an interesting question. I think
there is not a strong political valence in the Chevron cases. There have been
a number of empirical studies, both looking at the Supreme Court itself and
also looking at courts of appeals. And it’s hard to detect a strong political
impact that Chevron has had, either in terms of pro-agency or anti-agency.
I would say that Chevron is an important decision because it
changes the vocabulary, and it changes the conceptual framework in which
judges discuss these issues, and in so doing, it sort of highlights certain
questions like delegation, and it submerges other questions like the reliance
interest that people may have had in particular executive interpretations. So
I don’t think the decision is trivial by any means, but I don’t really see it as
having a strong political valence.
Massachusetts v. EPA, don’t get me started on this. The Obama
administration rescinded the interpretation of pollutants that was rendered
by the Bush administration. So if there was to be any deference, it would be
to the Obama administration interpretation, which was that carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases are pollutants.
But Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron, wrote a quintessential
activist step one Chevron decision which gave deference to nobody. In fact,
if you are a fan of textualism and plain meaning, you couldn’t find a more
textualist, plain-meaning decision than Massachusetts v. EPA, which just
said, “Oh, the statute defines pollutant to mean this, and this, and this.
Greenhouse gases include that.
Therefore, greenhouse gases are
pollutants.”69 No consideration was given to the structure of the Act, how
radically incomprehensible it would be to apply greenhouse gases under the
Clean Air Act, given the structure of the Clean Air Act.
So, yes, it was a politically-motivated decision. It was a decision
designed to send a shot across the bow of what the Court regarded as footdragging on the question of regulating greenhouse gases, but that’s
something courts can do with or without Chevron.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Does anyone else want to
respond to that, or do we want to move to the next question?
[No audible response.]
ATTENDEE: Thank you. Regarding independent adjudicatory agencies, I
would question whether or not the name Chevron should be changed to BP,
British Petroleum, if you get the humor. The bottom line is if you do a
69
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https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol39/iss3/3

2015]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PANEL

373

statistical analysis, when the National Labor Relations Board evaluates
cases and comes up with standards to apply, to determine whether the Act
has been violated or not, and when in the course of thirty years or twenty
years or even four years, the case decision leading to a new standard, the
precedent has been flip-flopped anywhere from three times to eight times.
There is a direct correlation between the flip-flopping and the jamming of
the political majority on the board, and I can assure you that almost every
labor lawyer I speak with wants the National Labor Relations Act to be
amended to establish all cases go from the administrative law judge to an
Article III federal district court.
There is no way to suggest that deference to administrative expertise
is appropriate when you get outcomes that are directly correlative to the
political majority on the board.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: So is that your question?
ATTENDEE: My question is, I wanted to make sure that all of you agree,
yes or no.
[Laughter.]
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Any of you?
JIDE O. NZELIBE: I was going to say one thing very quickly with respect
to this kind of question. Again, on a very specific narrow issue, on the
question of City of Arlington, these issues—and I think Justice Scalia makes
it clear. There is no judicial abdication here. I mean, apply step two
rigorously. Apply step one rigorously. If an agency is doing something that
is unreasonable, it will be struck down.70
The deference thing there has to do with jurisdiction, and the
question is whether or not that poses, if you want to call it, more cost than
benefit. So the kinds of issues that you bring up, what I am suggesting is
that there may be ways to patrol that, that Chevron is not necessarily
tampering with, because if it looks like the agency is really behaving in a
politically crass way, a court can strike it down based upon either a plain
meaning or an arbitrary capricious standard under step two.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Professor Merrill, did you have
something you needed to add?
THOMAS W. MERRILL: Yeah. I answered the first question
erroneously. Massachusetts v. EPA was decided before the Obama
administration took office.
The general counsel’s interpretation had flip-flopped from an earlier
70
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one that say that greenhouse gases were covered during the Clinton
administration to the Bush II administration saying they were not covered,
but the interpretation was in a counsel opinion letter. It was not in a
regulation having the force of law, so it would not have been entitled to
Chevron deference.
Anyway, the Court didn’t talk about deference of any sort in that
opinion.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD:
question.

I believe we have another

ATTENDEE: Yeah. I fear I’m terribly out of my depth on this question,
but I’m just wondering if the issues that you’ve been discussing on this very
interesting panel have any relationship to the seemingly very elastic
interpretation coming out of HHS with respect to the enforcement of the
Affordable Care Act.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Any takers?
[Laughter.]
THOMAS W. MERRILL: Well, the most recent interpretation came from
a White House press conference.
[Laughter and applause.]
THOMAS W. MERRILL: I don’t know where that rates under Chevron,
but I don’t think it rates for that.
[Laughter.]
KRISTIN HICKMAN: Ditto.
[Laughter.]
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Well, I have a question. What
is the diligent, conscientious lower-court judge supposed to do? Is he
supposed to be concerned with the fundamental abdication of his duties, or
is he supposed to take out his handy-dandy decision tree? Given this
painting, this tapestry, these different techniques, given the discussions of
the mirages and all of these lovely things, what is the diligent lower-court
judge supposed to do?
KRISTIN HICKMAN: Particularly for lower courts, you don’t have a
whole lot of choice but to live with Chevron and Mead, et cetera. The real
question then becomes how you interpret those cases and apply them,
particularly in the hard scenarios.
And when it comes to the impressionist model versus the decision
tree model, it is six of one, half dozen of the other, as far as I’m concerned.
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Either one of them strikes me as a plausible interpretation of Chevron and
Mead. But stare decisis is what it is. I don’t think you can put the horse
back in the barn. The Supreme Court may be able to, but lower court judges
don’t have that luxury.
THOMAS W. MERRILL: I would certainly urge you to read Arlington
narrowly.
[Laughter.]
THOMAS W. MERRILL: I mean, in terms of boundary maintenance, the
law has got a lot of things that are very inconsistent with Arlington. For
example, preemption has been a very hot issue in the Court in recent years,
and in a number of those cases, questions arose as to how much deference
the Court should give to federal administrative agencies as to whether or not
the statutes they administer preempt certain types of state, tort suits, or other
types of state action. In none of those cases was the Court willing to give
Chevron deference to federal administrative agencies on the question of
whether the statute had preemptive effect.
The Court in the most elaborate decision of Wyeth v. Levine said it
was something more like Skidmore deference but not Chevron deference.71
But the law in that area very much reflects a resistance to courts going
whole hog and just letting the agency decide the preemption question.
When there is a constitutional issue in the case, whether it be a
question of federal constitutional power under the Commerce Clause or
some kind of individual rights provision, the courts don’t defer to agencies
on those questions. They exercise independent judgments.
So I think I would not read Arlington to say that when boundary
maintenance questions come up, just throw up your hands and say,
“whatever the agency says, it sounds reasonable, I will go along with.” I
think that that decision is an outlier in terms of the larger tapestry of the law
that we have, and we have to wait for another decision or two before we can
read it for all it’s worth.
JIDE O. NZELIBE: Just one thing to all of that. I think there’s an article
by Adrian Vermeule called Mead in the Trenches, and what he tries to do is
look at how Mead has actually been applied in the D.C. Circuit, and he finds
that it’s all over the map, courts literally on a panel-by-panel basis.72 It’s
not, “We are applying the law, and we reach different outcomes.” It’s,
“They’re applying different conceptions of the law.” I mean, that’s not
good. That’s not rule of law, and this is what happens in a lot of these
situations when you have [inaudible] deference doctrines. I can go over
71
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there and slip into this deference if the following thing comes up. It’s that
courts genuinely end up confused.
And I just want to give you an example. We all discuss City of
Arlington as if we know what it’s about. It was granted cert. on the question
as to whether or not Chevron should apply when you’re reviewing the
termination of an agency’s own jurisdiction. City of Arlington decided
during oral argument when it’s going to file its briefing that it would rather
not have that be what it would like to address. It changed it to interpretive
authority.
Scalia hammered this issue, saying, “Well, we granted a question
about jurisdiction. What’s this business about interpretive authority?” The
dissent, that is, Justice Roberts, focuses on interpretive authority. Now, if
everybody is getting confused about difference between interpretive
authority and jurisdiction and why they are fighting these fights, it’s a little
bit complicated. It’s ambiguous. It’s confusing. It’s not clear. I read it
three times, and I know what the boundaries between interpretive authority
or what the strategic policy between using an interpretive authority rather
than jurisdiction are, and courts will. And in the trenches when these things
get litigated, they get all over the place, and you could say, “Oh, the courts
are patrolling the boundaries.” No. What they do is different people go
home, and they say, “You know what, you have different laws you can
observe,” and in the D.C. Circuit, if Judge Sentelle and Judge Garland are
on your panel, you may have a different view of what the deference will be.
And if Judge Williams is—Judge Williams is more like Scalia. He tries to
apply. He wants a clean Chevron deference rule. You will have a different
rule.
And I will give you one example. I tried to figure out what the law
is in the D.C. Circuit with respect to judicial deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its own jurisdiction. I came up with what seemed like two
or three different opinions from the court on this question that were
coexisting at the same time. It seemed to turn on which panel you had.
One, that said if there is a split among agencies about what the boundary of
jurisdiction is, that is, if there are two agencies or three agencies that had
interpretive authority, there shouldn’t be any deference. This is strange,
because in 1994, when the first case in the D.C. Circuit that discussed this
issue came about, it always involved a possible other agency that could have
authority. So almost all the cases that I found where they said, “No, you
should defer,” there was also another agency that could have interpretive
authority. It could be a state agency, just as it was in the City of Arlington.
So the question is now we have two different deference doctrines
about jurisdiction that we’re wandering around in the D.C. which—and it
depends. One panel may apply it, and the other won’t. These are people

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol39/iss3/3

2015]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PANEL

377

who have been working on administrative law. These are “the expert
judges” who have been working on administrative law for dozens and
dozens of years, and they are having this kind of mess in place. Imagine
what it is in district courts and places all over where people have to hit this
one at a time. It’s just that clarity is much better, even if it’s not clarity in
the angle that you like, and Chevron, every person who practices law, it
flows right off the top of their tongue. It’s a clear rule that everybody can
understand, and it’s probably much better to jam things into that rule
however uncomfortably than to have three or four places where they can
leak. And that’s sort of my impression of what happens in district courts.
KRISTIN HICKMAN: Well, I do want to respond to that on one level,
though, and say that, in talking about Chevron as clear, Chevron is not clear.
Just like we’re talking about having multiple views of the jurisdictional
question or multiple views of what Mead means, we’ve got multiple views
of what Chevron means. Just like, for that matter, when it comes down to
statutory interpretation in general, we have broad disagreement over
whether we should pursue originalist interpretative methods or textualist
methods or purposivist methods. We have been suffering through that lack
of clarity for just as long, if not longer, as we have been suffering through
the lack of clarity with Chevron and Mead. It all comes down to, just as we
have different reasonable interpretations of a particular set of statutory
terms, we are likewise going to have disagreements over what precedents
mean and how they apply in individual cases. Some cases will be clear. It’s
the marginal cases that are always hard, no matter what doctrine you’re
applying.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: I believe we have time for one
more question, and I think it’s this side of the room’s turn.
ATTENDEE: I want to acknowledge Jide’s stirring appeal to be careful
what you wish for in discussing concerns about Chevron. I think he’s right
in a case that was essentially playing out that factional dispute between big
oil and some alphabet soup of environmental groups, which that is, in a way,
a political question that could be handled.
But I wonder, Tom, if you too quickly surrendered the area of
judicial review for more individualized plaintiffs in this area. When you
take a case like Sackett, which I don’t think revolved on Chevron, but
maybe it was a boundary drawing case, where I think the courts can be
convinced they ought to perhaps have a different kind of deference
depending on the nature of those contending.73
THOMAS W. MERRILL: I think you are exactly right that Sackett is an
important case, and it underscores the Supreme Court’s understanding that
73
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agencies should not be able to coerce individuals.74 This was a wetlands
regulation case where EPA was arguing that it could issue orders to parties
about not filling wetlands and could somehow evade any judicial review of
those enforcement orders until various eons had passed, and the Supreme
Court said no, this is an adjudicative order, you get judicial review of this
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
So you are absolutely right that that’s an important boundary
maintenance decision, and it sort of underscores that judicial review is still
important for protecting individual rights.
My point was that once you get to the actual reviewing of these
individual rights where fact issues are particularly important, the courts
many years ago said that they will defer to fact-finding by agencies, unless it
lacks substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious.
And so the one thing that courts are really good at, which is factfinding, has been handed over to the agencies, and the courts will only
interfere if there is some kind of really obvious miscarriage of justice. And
that’s deference, and that’s a kind of weakening of one function of judicial
review, which I think suggests that the judicial review is not performing the
robust function it might otherwise perform in that area.
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Do any of our other panelists
have final thoughts?
[No audible response.]
JUDGE JENNIFER WALKER ELROD: Well, let’s thank our panelists
for such a thought-provoking discussion.
[Applause.]
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